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 Reflecting Culture: Polygamy  
and the Charter 
Carissima Mathen 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Any society that seeks to be diverse yet bound by common values 
will face deep challenges. Inevitably, conflicts emerge over what it 
means to live a good life. In section 27, the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms1 states as a general interpretative principle that its rights 
and freedoms must be applied so as to preserve and maintain the multi-
cultural heritage of Canadians. While it has been invoked infrequently,2 
section 27 stands with other broad ideals of our political community — 
such as pluralism, mutual respect and human dignity — which constitute 
important aspects of our legal culture. 
Early “diversity” disputes revolved mainly around ethno-racial dif-
ference, spurred by dramatic demographic changes in post-war Canada. 
Cross-cultural interactions concentrated on particular manifestations of 
difference such as dress, food and celebration. These symbols might 
occasionally cause disquiet, but more probable reactions ranged from 
indifference to (enthusiastic) curiosity. In time, these disputes produced a 
variety of legal norms. 
In recent years, the basis of such disputes has shifted from ethno-
racial to religious difference (admittedly, these can be blurred together). 
This is to be expected, as religion has assumed a more prominent role in 
public discourse and in the framing of political controversies. Additionally, 
                                                                                                             
 Associate Professor of Law, University of Ottawa. I thank Michael Plaxton, and an 
anonymous reviewer, for comments on earlier drafts. 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.); Multani v. Commis-
sion scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] S.C.J. No. 6, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.). 
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the tone of the debate is sharper. “Difference” — especially religious 
difference — is now associated with an existential threat to society itself.3 
In this paper, I will explore one of these supposed existential contro-
versies: polygamy.4 As a site of difference, polygamy is overwhelmingly 
associated with religion. It is thought to represent a not-so-thin wedge 
capable of overwhelming existing Canadian culture. I believe that such 
perceptions reflect a profound misunderstanding. In the brief confines of 
this paper, I suggest that the debate over polygamy only looks like an 
instance of cross-cultural clash. Its true significance is as a site of intra-
cultural conflict and contestation — a glass through which our own legal 
system is reflected, darkly.5 
II. THE REFERENCE 
Polygamy is an odd sort of crime. Though it has always been prohi-
bited in Canada,6 no one has been prosecuted in over 50 years.7 Yet, 
                                                                                                             
3 Sam Harris, The End of Faith (New York: Norton, 2005); Samuel Huntington, “The 
Clash of Civilizations” (1993) 72:3 Foreign Affairs 22; Mark Steyn, “The Future Belongs to Islam” 
Macleans (October 20, 2006), online: <http://www.macleans.ca>. 
4 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 293: 
 293(1) Every one who 
(a) practises or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to practise or 
enter into 
(i) any form of polygamy, or 
(ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same 
time, 
whether or not it is by law recognized as a binding form of marriage, or 
(b) celebrates, assists or is a party to a rite, ceremony, contract or consent that 
purports to sanction a relationship mentioned in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii), 
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
five years. 
 (2) Where an accused is charged with an offence under this section, no averment 
or proof of the method by which the alleged relationship was entered into, agreed to 
or consented to is necessary in the indictment or on the trial of the accused, nor is it 
necessary on the trial to prove that the persons who are alleged to have entered into 
the relationship had or intended to have sexual intercourse. 
5 Image borrowed from The Bible, 1 Corinthians 13:12. 
6 The offence appeared in the 1892 Code as s. 278 and is now found in s. 293. Criminal 
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The term is often misunderstood in common parlance. “Polygamy” 
refers to a relationship involving more than two people, regardless of the ratio between the sexes. 
“Polygyny” is a relationship between one man and more than one woman, and “polyandry” involves 
one woman and more than one man. In all cases, the relationship is one that is marital or marriage-
like. In contrast, “polyamory” refers to intimate relationships involving more than two persons, but 
which are not necessarily marital or marriage-like. Popular discussion tends to focus on polygyny, 
but polygamy includes both polygamy and polyandry, and the fact that s. 293 extends to “conjugal 
unions” raises the issue of whether it also includes polyamory. The Court’s resolution of this issue is 
discussed below. 
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polygamy is now viewed as a pressing social problem. It is linked 
primarily to outsider communities such as the one in Bountiful, British 
Columbia whose residents practice a form of Mormon polygamy. The 
provincial government has been focused on this group for many years.8 
Another outsider group is made up of recent immigrants from jurisdic-
tions which recognize polygamy and at least some of whom are thought 
to practise it here.9 
It is interesting, but not determinative, that the issue of what to do 
about polygamy has resurfaced at the same time as other socio-legal 
developments reformulating the notion of “family”.10 It is true that some 
have argued against expanding marriage on the basis that such changes 
would not end with same-sex equality, but lead inexorably to other 
definitional limits.11 Despite a surface similarity, though, the debates over 
same-sex marriage and polygamy raise distinct issues: legal recognition 
on one hand, and criminal prohibition on the other. More likely, the 
resurgence of public attention to polygamy was created partly by greater 
awareness of the practice in certain communities in Canada, and partly 
by growing concern that the law prohibiting it violates the Charter. 
In 2009, the Attorney General of British Columbia referred the fol-
lowing constitutional questions to the Supreme Court12 of British 
Columbia: 
                                                                                                             
7 Only two prosecutions have been recorded, both against Aboriginal men: R. v. Bone, 
[1899] 4 Terr. L.R. 173, 3 C.C.C. 329 (S.C.C.); R. v. Harris (1906), 11 C.C.C. 254 (Que. S.C.). 
8 An attempt to indict Winston Blackmore and James Oler was quashed in Blackmore v. 
British Columbia (Attorney General), [2009] B.C.J. No. 1890, 247 C.C.C. (3d) 544 (B.C.S.C.). The 
Supreme Court of British Columbia held that the Attorney General had exceeded the authority 
provided in the Crown Counsel Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 87 by appointing successive special 
prosecutors in the hopes of getting the go-ahead to proceed with a charge. Two special prosecutors 
had recommended, instead, that the government seek an advisory opinion. 
9 Nicholas Bala, “Polygamy in Canada: Justifiably Not Tolerated” JURIST - Forum (De-
cember 3, 2011), online: Jurist - Forum <http://jurist.org/forum/2011/12/nicholas-bala-canada-
polygamy.php>. 
10 Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33. 
11 For a dramatic example, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), per Scalia J. (dis-
senting). For a contrary view, see Robert Leckey, “Following Same-Sex Marriage: Redefining 
Marriage and the Impact for Polygamy” (2007) 2:1 Les Ateliers De L’Ethique 30. 
12 The British Columbia Supreme Court is a trial level court. Among Canadian jurisdictions, 
only British Ccolumbia and Manitoba permit references at this level. This is the first reference of its 
kind in Canada, and the only one that I have been able to discover in similar common law 
jurisdictions where courts perform an advisory function. On March 26, 2012 the Minister of Justice 
for British Columbia declared that it had no intention of further appealing the ruling. It stated that the 
opinion enables “police and prosecutors to act with authority in investigating and prosecuting 
criminally polygamous relationships.” Ministry of Justice, News Release 2012JAG0023-000297, 
“No further reference in polygamy case” (March 26, 2012) online: <http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/
news_releases_2009-2013/2012JAG0023-000297.htm>. 
360 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
a. Is section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada consistent with 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? If not, in what 
particular or particulars and to what extent? 
b. What are the necessary elements of the offence in section 293 of 
the Criminal Code of Canada? Without limiting this question, does 
section 293 require that the polygamy or conjugal union in 
question involved a minor, or occurred in a context of dependence, 
exploitation, abuse of authority, a gross imbalance of power, or 
undue influence?13 
The hearing began in late 2010 and took six months to complete. It 
involved a dozen intervenors, many more witnesses and a mountain of 
evidence. An amicus curiae was appointed to argue the case against the 
law’s validity. 
On November 23, 2011, Bauman C.J. issued a 265-page opinion. He 
accepted that insofar as the law criminalizes a religiously motivated 
choice to enter into a polygamous union, this constitutes a prima facie 
violation of section 2(a)14 of the Charter. He also found that insofar as it 
applies to persons under the age of 18, the law violates section 715 of the 
Charter. He rejected arguments that section 293 violates section 2(b)16 or 
section 2(d),17 or that, when applied to adults, it violates the principles of 
fundamental justice. He concluded that the section 2(a) violation could 
be saved under section 1, but the section 7 violation for minors could not, 
and he therefore advised that the law was unconstitutional in that 
respect.18 
Much of the opinion was taken up with reviewing the evidence in-
troduced about polygamy, though the majority of that related to polygyny 
and the Chief Justice recognized a tendency for the two to be conflated. 19 
Nonetheless, he accepted evidence about polygyny as relevant to the 
constitutional questions because polyandry is so rare. Ultimately, the 
Court found that Parliament has always had a “reasoned apprehension of 
harm arising out of the practice of polygamy”.20 That harm is both 
                                                                                                             
13 Reference re Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, [2011] B.C.J. No. 2211, 279 
C.C.C. (3d) 1, at para. 16 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Polygamy Reference”]. 
14 Section 2(a) protects the fundamental freedom of conscience and religion. 
15 Section 7 protects the right to life, liberty and security of the person against deprivations 
not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 
16 Section 2(b) protects the fundamental freedom of expression and other modes of thought 
and communication. 
17 Section 2(d) protects the fundamental freedom of association. 
18 See Polygamy Reference, supra, note 13, at para. 1100. 
19 See supra, note 6. 
20 Polygamy Reference, supra, note 13, at para. 5. 
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interpersonal and societal. Below, I deal with these aspects in turn, and 
then consider how the social harm analysis affected two critical issues. 
III. HARM TO WOMEN, TO CHILDREN AND TO MEN 
Chief Justice Bauman found that polygyny harms women in severe 
ways. It places women at “an elevated risk of physical and psychological 
harm”, including “higher rates of domestic violence and abuse”; it 
creates conditions of scarcity with respect to material and emotional 
well-being; it decreases autonomy and self-esteem, and increases marital 
dissatisfaction; and it leads women to have more children, in more 
dangerous ways, and to live shorter lives.21 
Polygyny was described as extremely negative for children. It is 
linked to a host of harmful effects: higher infant mortality; emotional, 
behavioural and physical problems; an absent or indifferent father figure; 
lower educational achievement; and greater risk of abuse and neglect.22 
In certain communities, polygyny creates negative consequences for 
men who are unable to secure the status required to take multiple wives. 
Frequently termed “Lost Boys”,23 these males are ejected from some 
societies “with few skills and no social support” as their presence 
threatens the viability of a “sexually asymmetrical system”.24 
I do not dispute polygyny’s association with harmful effects on its 
participants and other vulnerable persons such as children. (For ease of 
discussion I will focus on criminalizing “polygyny”, though section 293 
is much broader.) The fact, though, that polygynous relationships may be 
harmful in some (or even most) instances cannot overcome a Charter 
legal rights challenge if the Crown is relieved from having to demon-
strate that harm actually is present in a given relationship. To the extent 
that plural marriage functions as a proxy or substituted element for 
interpersonal harm, one must be able to show that such harm is so closely 
related to polygyny as to flow inexorably from it.25 Plainly this is not the 
                                                                                                             
21 Id., at para. 8. 
22 Id., at para. 9. 
23 Daphne Bramham, The Secret Lives of Saints: Child Brides and Lost Boys in Canada’s 
Polygamous Mormon Sect (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2008). Polygamy Reference, id., at para. 382. 
24 Polygamy Reference, id., at para. 586. 
25 R. v. Whyte, [1988] S.C.J. No. 63, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). I recognize that it might be 
possible to save such a substituted element under s. 1. 
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case. It is quite possible that a particular polygynous relationship could 
raise a reasonable doubt about harm.26 
Even if section 293 was interpreted to require proof of harm in each 
case (perhaps by reading in an additional element), a separate issue arises 
from the fact that only plural relationships are so scrutinized — that 
polygyny performs a gatekeeper function for the kinds of relationships in 
which such harms warrant societal attention. As pointed out by the 
amicus curiae, all forms of marriage are stained by gender-based 
violence.27 One could try to justify a crime targeted at polygyny while 
leaving monogamy unscrutinized on the basis that, while some of the 
same interpersonal harms may occur within both types of relationships, 
they are especially severe or routine in polygyny. On this view, Parlia-
ment is entitled to employ tunnel vision: to single out for punishment a 
very small number of relationships where harm occurs while leaving 
untouched an enormous number of relationships creating the same kind 
of harm (even if such harm exists to a lesser degree). I have argued that 
such a narrowly constituted offence reflects an arbitrary exercise of the 
criminal law power that cannot be upheld in a system committed to 
fundamental justice.28 
Admittedly, the above-noted analysis has not enjoyed much favour in 
legal rights jurisprudence.29 The Chief Justice was not persuaded either: 
It seems to be obviously true, to an extent, that incidents of abuse arise 
in monogamous relationships. However, that does not really assist me 
here as I am considering the law that Parliament has directed against 
polygamy. I am concerned with the alleged harms arising out of this 
                                                                                                             
26 The problem is exacerbated in the real world context where s. 293 is not limited to poly-
gyny. It is impossible to sustain an argument that all polygamous marriages are harmful to their 
participants. For one thing, virtually all studies are focused exclusively on polygyny. Thus, s. 293 
risks convicting persons who are not in harmful relationships. Polygamy Reference, supra, note 13, 
at para. 959. I expand on this point below. 
27 See Affidavit #1 of Todd Shackelford, cited in Polygamy Reference, id., at para. 540 et 
seq. See also Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile 
2005 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2005), at 8 and 11, online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-224-
x/85-224-x2005000-eng.pdf>; Paula England, “Marriage, the Costs of Children, and Gender 
Equality” in Linda J. Waite, ed., The Ties That Bind (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2000) 320; 
Moge v. Moge, [1992] S.C.J. No. 107, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 (S.C.C.). 
28 See Carissima Mathen, “Big Love and Small Reasons: Considering Polygamy”, Lecture 
delivered at the University of Alberta and the University of Calgary/Sheldon Chumir Foundation, 
January 27-28, 2011, online: <www.chumirethicsfoundation.ca/main/page.php?page_id=334>. 
29  Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 
519 (S.C.C.); R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.); 
but see Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) 
and the dissenting opinions of McLachlin J. and L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Rodriguez. 
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practice and whether a reasoned apprehension of harm has motivated 
Parliament to enact the provision. That harm may arise out of other 
human relationships, that is, monogamous ones, seems beside the 
point.30 
Yet, such analysis is “beside the point” only if one adopts a particular 
approach to criminal law that rejects it as a site for the protection of 
fundamental justice.31 The Court ignored the particular stigmatization 
inherent in the criminal sanction, as well as the law’s ability to shield 
prejudice and oppress minorities. In short, the above approach discards a 
richer understanding of criminal law which would reveal the relationship 
between cultural mores and legal tradition that largely have shielded 
from scrutiny the choice to target one kind of conduct but not another. 
IV. HARM TO SOCIETY 
Although I believe the focus on the interpersonal harms of polygyny 
is flawed, their acceptance by the British Columbia Supreme Court is not 
really a surprise. What is so striking about the Polygamy Reference is the 
time that the Court spends cataloguing a particular kind of social harm. 
Some of the social harms accepted by the Court are rooted in assump-
tions about human nature. Others spring merely from the fact that 
polygamy is not monogamy. Under this argument, the critique that I 
advanced in the preceding section is denuded of much of its force. The 
focus on societal harm ― if supported ― would shield section 293 against 
challenges of arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality.32 
In analyzing the social harms posed by polygyny, Bauman C.J. drew 
on both literature reviews33 and on what he termed “powerful evidence”34 
provided by a commissioned statistical study. The study purported to 
                                                                                                             
30 Polygamy Reference, supra, note 13, at para. 544. 
31 Additionally, this casual dismissal would make it difficult to justify any violation of 
religious freedom (though, because of its social harms analysis discussed infra, the Court had no 
difficulty doing so). I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
32 The most recent discussion of these principles can be found in Canada (Attorney Gener-
al) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.); Bedford 
v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] O.J. No. 1296, 91 C.R. (6th) 257 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter 
“Bedford”]. 
33  Polygamy Reference, supra, note 13, at paras. 577-608. 
34  Id., at para. 624, describing the study introduced by Attorney General of Canada witness 
Dr. McDermott. 
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show the generalized negative results, across a variety of indicators,35 in 
societies which accept polygyny. 
The core of the analysis, though, drew on evolutionary psychology.36 
Citing expert testimony, Bauman C.J. found that human beings’ “mating 
strategies”37 propel both sexes to polygyny: 
Through polygyny, both men and women can effectively follow their 
evolved mating strategies. Polygyny allows males to form multiple 
simultaneous pair-bonds, while it also allows more females access to 
high-status males, as they are not monopolized by a single male.38 
The only forces capable of controlling such basic urges are “culturally-
transmitted social norms that motivate and regulate social behaviour”.39 
Chief among these norms is a marriage system which imposes rules 
about the numbers of and arrangements between partners. While social 
norms cannot entirely subvert mating psychology, “they can strongly 
influence behavioural patterns, both because compliance with these 
norms is intrinsically rewarding and because third parties are willing to 
punish norm violators”.40 
                                                                                                             
35  The study examined the following indicators: 
a) discrepancy between law and practice with respect to women’s equality ― this variable 
relates to whether a state’s laws accord with the United Nations Convention on the Elimi-
nation of Discrimination Against Women, and whether the country enforces these laws; 
b) birth rate; 
c) rates of primary and secondary education for male and female children; 
d) difference in HIV infection rates between men and women; 
e) age of marriage; 
f) maternal mortality, which refers to the number of women who die in childbirth; 
g) life expectancy; 
h) sex trafficking, including state compliance with relevant legislation; 
i) female genital mutilation; 
j) domestic violence, an omnibus measure incorporating domestic violence, rape, marital 
rape, and honour killings, as well as the extent and strength of the enforcement of the laws 
prohibiting these crimes in any given state; 
k) inequality of treatment of men and women before the law. At the low end are countries 
where the legal age of marriage is 18 or higher, women may choose their spouse, divorce 
is possible and both partners are treated equitably by law, abortion is permitted, and 
women may inherit property; 
l) defense expenditures; and  
m) political rights and civil liberties. 
Id., at para. 616. 
36  The Chief Justice described evolutionary psychology as “the study of the features of the 
mind with specific reference to our ancestral past as a way of trying to understanding how and why 
we behave in the present” (Id., at para. 494). 
37  Id., at para. 501. 
38  Id. 
39  Id., at para. 502. 
40  Id., at para. 502 (emphasis added). 
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The most important of these norms is “Socially Imposed Universal 
Monogamy” (SIUM).41 SIUM’s distinctive feature is that it requires 
monogamy from everyone, regardless of wealth, status or other factors 
which might soften the heavy burden on men who take more than one 
wife. Earliest documented societies displayed evidence of polygyny, until 
SIUM began to emerge as a countervailing norm. While its exact cause 
remains unknown, SIUM is thought to have arisen as part of general 
human development toward civic institutions and “the development of 
ideas of normative egalitarianism”.42 It emerged at the same time as 
“republicanism, citizenship rights, and high levels of collective action in 
the military and political spheres [which] can only be observed in ... 
Greece and Rome”.43 It is impossible to determine the degree to which 
SIUM might have influenced these other developments, but the Court found 
that the co-existence of these events probably was not coincidental.44 
SIUM is thus a norm that has regulated the conditions for entering 
marriage for approximately 1,750 years. In almost all Western nations, it 
is promoted by special legal recognition and benefits, and is enforced by 
criminal prohibitions against its opposite: polygamy. Yet, the fact that 
polygamy has been rejected throughout history is insufficient reason to 
continue to criminalize it. Many laws, once thought to embody essential 
moral truths, have in the fullness of time and social experience been 
rejected.45 The focus must be on the arguments supporting the law’s 
retention, and the potential consequences of jettisoning it. 
The Chief Justice thought that the risks of failing to maintain a social 
norm against polygamy are dire. First, a society which permits polygy-
nous relationships creates a (greater) pool of unmarried men. This 
derives from the “mathematical reality” that “when some men are able to 
have multiple wives simultaneously, other men will be unable to find 
[any]”.46 This pool could be as much as 40 per cent of all men who, in 
such a situation, are likely to “take substantial risks so that they [can] 
eventually participate in the mating and marriage market”.47 In fact, men 
                                                                                                             
41  Id., at para. 150. 
42  Id., at para. 154. 
43  Id., at para. 156. 
44  The correlations between monogamy and polygamy, and different kinds of social out-
comes, formed a large part of the Court’s analysis. 
45  H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969). 
46  Polygamy Reference, supra, note 13, at para. 505. 
47  Id., at para. 507. 
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unable to secure wives will tend to engage in criminal behaviour, 
including “murder, robbery and rape”.48 
The harm of polygyny described in the Polygamy Reference is not 
solely captured by higher male crime. It includes more negative intra-
family dynamics, specifically, that “high-status men could choose to 
invest their resources in acquiring more wives rather than investing in 
their children”.49 Additionally, polygyny has been observed to lower the 
age of marriage for women and girls; increase the age gap between 
spouses; and worsen gender equality through, for example, depressing 
participation in the paid workforce.50 The Court acknowledged that many 
of these effects were found in nations much less developed than Canada, 
but stated that controlling for such external factors overcame any barriers 
to comparison. Other, more speculative outcomes of SIUM include a 
preponderance of democratic institutions,51 greater social equality52 and 
even increased gross domestic product.53 
Polygyny, in other words, is an “X” factor that opens the floodgates 
to a powerful male id that has just barely been subdued. In the absence of 
a sufficient legal sanction, it would quickly overwhelm the stable societal 
platform developed over two millennia. Après monogamy, it seems, la 
déluge. 
The amicus argued vigorously that the Court should not rely on mere 
correlations. He characterized the regression analysis as a kind of 
“abracadabra” that linked every “evil on the planet” to “one man having 
more than one wife”.54 In addition, monogamy itself has been under-
mined by significant demographic shifts completely unconnected from 
the restrictions (or lack thereof) on polygamy.55 The Court found such 
arguments to simply reflect a misunderstanding of statistical analysis, 
                                                                                                             
48  Id., at para. 509. 
49  Id., at para. 518. 
50  Id., at paras. 522-533. 
51  Id., at para. 536. 
52  Id. 
53  Id., at para. 535, citing the Affidavit of Dr. Henrich: 
[W]hen monogamy is imposed “the fertility rate goes down, the age gap goes down, 
saving rates go up, bride prices disappear, and GDP per capita goes way up”. [The] 
model was based on the assumptions that men and women care about both having 
children and “consuming”, that men are capable of reproducing during much more of 
their life than women, and that men tend to prefer younger women. In this model, 
when a ban on polygyny prevents men from investing in obtaining further wives, they 
instead save and invest in production and consumption. 
54  Id., at 629. 
55  Id., at paras. 468-481, citing the Affidavit of Dr. Zheng Wu. 
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which can only show possible relationships and is not meant to demon-
strate factual causation. 56 
Chief Justice Bauman acknowledged that the catalogue of serious 
supposed harms are predicated upon a non-trivial increase in the practice 
of polygyny. For a number of reasons, he found that, in the absence of a 
criminal sanction, polygyny would spread in Canada. Evolutionary 
psychology posits that we are naturally inclined to such relationships. A 
complex matrix of social and legal norms — including the criminal 
sanction — has developed over 2,000 years to blunt that instinct. Were 
the prohibition on polygamy to be lifted, polygyny could take hold 
among the broader society fairly easily, especially if adopted by celebri-
ties and other high-status individuals.57 In addition, Canada would 
become a “beacon” for immigrants from around the world who no longer 
would be automatically inadmissible. The Court noted that immigrants 
from underdeveloped countries (where polygamy is widespread) tend to 
have more children — an additional factor that could lead to higher 
incidence of polygamy.58 
In my view, the social harms analysis described above encompasses 
a number of disturbing assumptions and principles that are entirely 
contrary to Charter values. First, the Polygamy Reference relies on 
deeply heteronormative reasoning. It imbues (opposite-sex) monagamous 
marriage with miraculous powers — not only a primary mover in 
Western civilization, it encourages democracy, equality and better 
economic outcomes (though not a word is stated about the breakdown of 
such goods along gender lines).59 Even accepting that some sort of 
criminal control on polygamy is worthwhile, many persons would find 
this account of monogamous marriage baffling.60 
                                                                                                             
56  The Court recognized the “third variable” problem, quoting as described by a witness 
(Id., at para. 637): 
Yes, there’s what is known as the third variable problem. It actually goes by that par-
ticular label in statistics, and this is in correlational research you may find that there is 
a relationship between two variables but it is always possible that there is a third vari-
able that you haven’t measured or that you’re not aware of that, in fact, is causing 
both of the variables that you happen to be assessing. 
57  Id., at para. 555. 
58  Id., at para. 560. 
59  Chief Justice Bauman did recognize that it is not possible to absolutely divine causation 
from correlation. But, because of the “reasoned apprehension of harm” standard that he applies to 
constitutional scrutiny of criminal law, the extent of the asserted correlations becomes an important 
element in the justification of any Charter infringements (to the extent that he finds any). 
60  Comments on the Polygamy Reference by Kasari Govender & Yvonne Zylan, Law-
Femme 11:1 (February 2012), online: <http://issuu.com/ubccfls/docs/lawfemme-february-2012>. 
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Second, the Polygamy Reference employs aggressive legal moralism 
to justify a remarkably punitive61 measure. The Court posits a bleak 
model of male personhood focused upon unbounded sexuality and 
violence, and a despairing picture of female victimization. The opinion 
also plays upon fears of the “Other” as exemplified in its imagery of 
Canada becoming a target for undesirable polygamists who will seek to 
transform our society (aided by their increased fecundity). 
A particularly worrying aspect of the opinion is its incorporation of 
biological essentialism using evolutionary psychology. Biological 
essentialism is utterly at odds with the prevailing values of the Charter, 
such as individual respect, autonomy, choice and care. A society commit-
ted to equal regard and respect for others cannot justify the application of 
state coercion by recourse to notions that men are essentially violent 
creatures whom the law must civilize; or that women are wholly depend-
ent upon male power and privilege for their personal security. The 
momentum of criminal law over the last century has been away from 
such deterministic concepts. The Polygamy Reference’s use of them is 
startling. Such techniques legitimize punishment based on the crudest of 
group generalizations. I hasten to add that the use of such generalizations 
is quite separate from progressive developments in criminal law, for 
example, the way that recognition of sexism spurred changes to the law 
of sexual assault.62 In the latter case, a statistical over-representation of 
male-female victimization, combined with pre-existing societal stereo-
types, requires the law to take special care not to further perpetuate sex 
inequality. The generalizations at play in the Polygamy Reference are 
different ― they represent idealized notions of maleness and femaleness 
which cache out in an offence requiring no proof of harm, because the 
entire focus is on preserving those notions. 
                                                                                                             
61  This is perfectly expressed in Bauman C.J.’s willingness to criminalize female partici-
pants in polygynous unions notwithstanding the presumptive harm they experience and notwith-
standing that they may have entered such unions below the age of majority. In dismissing arguments 
about overbreadth, Bauman C.J. stated: “I question whether the capable consenting spouse is a 
‘victim’. To the contrary, she can be seen to be facilitating an arrangement which Parliament views 
as harmful to society generally”. (Polygamy Reference, supra, note 13, at para. 1197). 
62  R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.); R. v. Darrach, [2000] 
S.C.J. No. 46, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443 (S.C.C.). 
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V. HOW MONOGAMY SAVES A POLYGAMY  
OFFENCE ― TWO POINTS 
The Court’s analysis also had important implications for two critical 
issues relating to the law’s validity: the correct statutory interpretation of 
the provision, and the law’s original purpose. 
Some of the parties, anticipating at least some constitutional infir-
mity with section 293, had argued that it could be read down to capture 
only polygyny, or to require proof of an additional element. Recall that 
the great majority of Bauman C.J.’s decision examined the dangers and 
myriad harms of polygyny, and uncovered little evidence of such 
interpersonal harms in other plural relationships. Recall, as well, that the 
second constitutional question invited the Court to consider reading in 
additional elements such as “exploitation” or “undue influence”. It would 
not have been surprising for Bauman C.J. to incorporate such arguments 
to safeguard the law against charges of overbreadth or gross dispropor-
tionality. Yet he did not. 
The amicus had pressed for the broadest reading of section 293, ar-
guing that the use of the term “conjugal union” extends to any relation-
ship which bears indicia of a conjugal relationship as currently 
understood in law: essentially, any kind of committed, permanent 
relationship between three or more people.63 The Attorney General of 
Canada opposed any reading down based on gender ratios of the partici-
pants. Canada argued that section 293 “prohibits practicing or entering 
into multiple simultaneous marriages, whether sanctioned by civil, 
religious or other means”.64 The intervener, West Coast LEAF, argued 
that section 293 could be read down to include only “exploitative” 
polygyny.65 In contrast, the Attorney General of British Columbia stated 
that the presence of “duplicative” marriage functions as the core element 
of section 293.66 It identified the chief concern with polygamy as 
“institutional” approval of plural relationships which is only given to 
                                                                                                             
63  Some of these indicia include shared shelter, sexual and personal behaviour, services, 
social activities, economic support and children, as well as the societal perception of the couple. 
Molodowich v. Penttinen, [1980] O.J. No. 1904, 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), cited in M. v. 
H., [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 59 (S.C.C.). 
64  Polygamy Reference, supra, note 13, at para. 931. 
65  The suggestion is almost identical to the technique ultimately employed by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in Bedford with respect to s. 212(1)(j) (living on the avails of prostitution): supra, 
note 32, at para. 222. 
66  Polygamy Reference, supra, note 13, at para. 953. 
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“marriage”. It also challenged the idea that non-polygynous unions share 
the same marital characteristics as polygyny.67 
The Court rejected the suggestion to read down polygamy to capture 
only polygyny. It noted that where Parliament means to enact a gender-
based crime it has done so explicitly, for example, with earlier versions 
of bigamy. The focus of section 293 is on “multiple marriages, that is, 
pair-bonding relationships sanctioned by civil, religious or other 
means”.68 The Court then distinguished marriage from common law 
relationships, stating that the inclusion of a separate prohibition of 
“conjugal unions” was enacted out of excessive caution rather than any 
intention to capture non-marital relationships: 
The original polygamy prohibition was proposed in An Act to Amend 
an Act Respecting Offences Relating to the Law of Marriage ― the law 
of marriage, not more casual, unformalized relationships ... A “conjugal 
union” coming within the prohibition may not need be recognized as a 
“binding form of marriage”, but the whole thrust of the section is that it 
must be a purported form of marriage.69 
Given space constraints, I will refrain from detailed criticism of the 
Court’s statutory interpretation, except to note that it is difficult to square 
with: (a) section 293’s express exclusion of any requirement to prove 
“the method by which the alleged relationship was entered into”;70 and 
(b) the section’s extension to any plural relationship “whether or not it is 
by law recognized as a form of marriage”.71 More telling is the reason 
that section 293 is given such a peculiar interpretation (an interpretation 
that the Court itself admits is counterintuitive72): 
                                                                                                             
67  Id., at paras. 958-960: 
The evidence indicates no significant religious, cultural or legal tradition, anywhere in 
the world, that includes among its tenets polyandrous or same-sex multi-partner un-
ions. There are five affidavits from polyandrous polyamorists in Canada, but it may 
be doubted whether any of them is in a polygamous marriage or conjugal union 
within the prima facie scope of section 293 ― none of the relationships has been of 
long-standing (it appears the longest has endured three years), none involves a sanc-
tioning authority or external influence, and the parties appear to consider themselves 
bound only as long as they choose. (Emphasis added.) 
68  Id., at para. 987 (emphasis in original). 
69  Polygamy Reference, id., at paras. 1015-1017 (emphasis in original). 
70  Supra, note 4, s. 293(2). 
71  Id., s. 293(1). The focus on some sort of “sanctioning event” also, in my view, presents a 
possible disproportionate impact (and discrimination claim) on the basis of religious freedom. 
72  Polygamy Reference, supra, note 13, at para. 1035: 
It may fairly be said that in interpreting s. 293, I have had “a lot of explaining to do”; 
that its drafting has required the Court to tread a difficult route in an effort to clarify 
its meaning. But today’s provision is the product of 1890’s drafting which, as we have 
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[The offence reflects] the pre-eminent place that the institution of 
monogamous marriage takes in Western culture and, as we have seen, 
Western heritage over the millennia. When all is said, I suggest that the 
prohibition in s. 293 is directed in part at protecting the institution of 
monogamous marriage.73 
This, of course, means that all participants in any plural marriage are 
caught by the provision and subject to punishment. 
At this point, the Court briefly addressed an obvious concern with 
the male-female dynamic at the core of its analysis: how, then, to account 
for same-sex marriage? The answer is that “committed same-sex rela-
tionships celebrate all of the values we seek to preserve and advance in 
monogamous marriage”.74 The slippery slope argument that there is an 
inexorable line from same-sex equality to polygamy was misconceived: 
[T]he doctrinal underpinnings of monogamous same-sex marriage are 
indistinguishable from those of heterosexual marriage as revised to 
conform to modern norms of gender equality. This counters, as well ... 
the sentiment often expressed that the “State has no business in the 
bedrooms of the Nation”. Here, I say it does when in defence of what it 
views is a critical institution ― monogamous marriage ― from attack 
by an institution ― polygamy ― which is said to be inevitably 
associated with serious harms.75 
While the above language sounds inclusive of LGBT equality, one 
should remember that arguments about the “essential” nature of marriage 
have been used to perpetuate inequality.76 Much of the Court’s analysis is 
difficult to square with non-heterosexual family formation. 
                                                                                                             
seen, created an offence with a number of redundant layers. Those layers, in turn, 
were stripped away slowly and surely until ... we were left with the compressed ker-
nel of the offence we see today. I must say that the metaphor of the committee design-
ing the horse comes to mind, but s. 293 is what the Court is left to struggle with; to 
give effect to, if possible, in light of the rules which govern these matters. 
73  Id., at para. 1041. 
74  Id. 
75  Id., at para. 1042 (emphasis added). 
76  Sam Shulman, “Gay Marriage – and Marriage” (November 2003), online: OrthodoxyTo-
day.org <http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles2/SchulmanGayMarriage.php>: 
To me, what is at stake in this debate is not only the potential unhappiness of children, 
grave as that is; it is our ability to maintain the most basic components of our human-
ity. ... Some of our fellow citizens wish to impose a radically new understanding upon 
laws and institutions that are both very old and fundamental to our organization as in-
dividuals and as a society ... Let me try to be more precise. Marriage can only concern 
my connection to a woman (and not to a man) because, ... marriage is an institution 
that is built around female sexuality and female procreativity. (The very word “mar-
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For me, a second telling moment in the opinion was its analysis of 
legislative purpose. Having found that the law violates both section 2(a)77 
and section 778 of the Charter, the Court turned to section 1. Here, it had 
to determine the original motivation behind the 1892 polygamy offence 
(at that time, section 278).79 The amicus argued that the law stemmed 
from religious animus or, at least, a determination to protect a Christian 
view of marriage. Such a conclusion was bolstered by legislative history 
showing that parliamentarians were particularly concerned by a potential 
influx of fundamentalist Mormons from U.S. territories, where polygamy 
had been outlawed.80 To the extent that the law was rooted in sectarian 
                                                                                                             
riage” comes from the Latin word for mother, mater.) It exists for the gathering-in of 
a woman’s sexuality under the protective net of the human or divine order, or both. 
77  The violation of religious freedom is made out because, for some individuals, the desire 
to enter into a polygamous union arises either out of a perceived religious obligation, or as a means 
of deepening their faith. Polygamy Reference, supra, note 13, at para. 1091. 
78  The Court accepted that criminalizing a person’s choice of family structure violates both 
her liberty and security of the person. 
79  The original offence read as follows in Criminal Code, 1892 (U.K.), 55 & 56 Vict., c. 29, 
s. 278: 
 Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for five 
years, and to a fine of five hundred dollars, who – 
(a) practises, or, by the rites, ceremonies, forms, rules or customs of any denomina-
tion, sect or society, religious or secular, or by any form of contract, or by mere 
mutual consent, or by any other method whatsoever, and whether in a manner 
recognized by law as a binding form of marriage or not, agrees or consents to 
practise or enter into  
(i) any form of polygamy; 
(ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same time; 
(iii) what among the persons commonly called Mormons is known as spiritual or 
plural marriage; 
(iv) who lives, cohabits, or agrees or consents to live or cohabit, in any kind of 
conjugal union with a person who is married to another, or with a person 
who lives or cohabits with another or others in any kind of conjugal union; 
or 
(b) celebrates, is a party to, or assists in any such rite or ceremony which purports to 
make binding or to sanction any of the sexual relationships mentioned in para-
graph (a) of this section; or 
(c) procures, enforces, enables, is a party to, or assists in the compliance with, or 
carrying out of, any such form, rule or custom which so purports; or 
(d) procures, enforces, enables, is a party to, or assists in the execution of, any such 
form of contract which so purports, or the giving of any such consent which so 
purports. 
80  Susan Drummond, “A marriage of fear and xenophobia. Our criminalization of polygamy 
is not about protecting women” The Globe and Mail (April 6, 2009), online: <http://www.globeandmail.com>; 
Bev Baines, “Polygamy ruling should trouble feminists” The Toronto Star (November 28, 2011), 
online: <http://www.thestar.com>. 
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sentiment, it would fail to demonstrate a pressing and substantial 
objective.81 
To be sure, Parliament did amend section 278 in 1954 (creating the 
present section 293) to remove some of its more troubling components, 
such as the explicit reference to Mormon marriage.82 So, one could argue 
that even if the original law was motivated by religious animus, the later 
amendment removed any such taint.83 Strikingly, the Court did not make 
this claim. Instead, it found that the law in 1892 was not motivated by 
any animus whatsoever: 
There is little question that the arrival of Mormons from Utah was a 
galvanizing influence on many of those who supported the introduction 
of s. 293. However, I do not agree ... that this reflected religious animus 
on the part of Parliament. ...The polygamy prohibition enacted in 1890 
reflected a historical aversion to the practice that was many centuries 
old ... [Section 293] has always been seen as addressing the risk of 
harm to women, children and society, although our understanding of 
the harms associated with polygamy has become more nuanced over 
time.84 
The above account is one of overriding concern for women. Yet it 
ignores much of women’s oppression at the relevant time, including 
within the institution of marriage. Most of the harm perpetrated on 
women was condoned, if not actively encouraged, by the state. To take 
but one example, marital rape was not an offence until 1983. Surely this, 
as opposed to a polygamy offence, is more revealing of a society’s true 
attitude toward marriage equality. 
The Court describes a prevailing social ethos, rooted in ancient 
norms, that was really concerned with women’s welfare. The claim rings 
hollow. It distorts the reality of gendered oppression within marriage to 
draw the necessary negative comparisons with the feared and hated 
practice of polygamy. In the service of monogamy, women’s inequality is 
erased from juridical consciousness. A genuine concern with women’s 
equality in family relationships would not be narrowly focused on the 
outlier practice of polygamy. It would consider whether criminal law and 
other legal tools are capable of addressing harm in all interpersonal 
                                                                                                             
81  R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
82  Supra, note 79, s. 278(a)(iii). The essence of the offence, though, did not change. 
83  I believe this argument lacks sufficient evidence of a true change in Parliamentary inten-
tion in 1954. But it raises a credible point of debate. 
84  Polygamy Reference, supra, note 13, at paras. 1088-1089 (emphasis added). 
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relationships. It would not pay singular attention to the cultural practices 
of tiny minorities, but would be open to recognizing the myriad ways in 
which all women are vulnerable to harm, exploitation and abuse in their 
intimate lives. 
And so, what I find most illuminating about the Polygamy Reference 
is not its discussion of polygamy, but its discussion of law. The opinion 
does not function primarily to tease out a “clash” between Canadian and 
“foreign” culture. On the court’s own terms, the forces propelling us to 
polygyny are not foreign. They rest deep within us. The Polygamy 
Reference powerfully illustrates law’s propensity to shame, to exclude 
and to punish in the service of deep, even ancient norms ― “the laws 
whose penalties I would not incur from the gods, through fear of any 
man’s temper”.85 It is a stark reminder of the ever-present choice attend-
ing the Charter: what is this society that we wish to have, to create, to 
honour? The world that is reflected to us by the Polygamy Reference is 
not a world that I recognize, nor is it one that accords with the promise 
and essential regard for humanity in the constitutional project of the last 
30 years. 
                                                                                                             
85  Sophocles, Antigone, at lines 502-503. 
